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'l I i"I .: l i·T'I LE P , 
Case !Jo. 19156 
t "'· c'.LhAh[;'.: :.,:r.·;TLEP, 
Lefenddnt/App~llant. 
FEPLY B~IEF OF ~EFENDANT/APPELLA~T 
'.:';'ATE'"':t:T OF Ft.C:TS 
~ppellar.t re1te,ates the facts herein by reference to 
tc.~ c:t:ot~r.e-r.t tt.c-cec: 0 sntained in her initial brief; it appears 
r Reep ndcnt's recitation of the facts that he is in substan-
tia! arreement with Appellant's statement as well. 
Appellant vigcrcusly di~p~tes, however, Respondent's 
r.ac "acte~ as beth father and mct~er" to the 
ine:·por.~cnt's Prief at 4). Respondent cites 
i ;1 ~ ~ , r~ cc c ; d i r-: .:: u t s ~anti at i or, of such a c 1 a i rr, , and 
·.,.: ~ , r . , 
.. ' 
r ~~ ~ c._ r ,~ : c.::: .:: ~ u ch s G b st ant lat lo n ex ls t . To 
.tc tr.at tne [_strict ~curt, at the 
i '. '.' •. r· ( t. , l cu n c: /'. ~- p e 11 ;or. t : c t e a fit 
t c : , " ·:r · J c d 1· i :c i t a t i or. w i t h tr. e c hi 1 d !"en 
(R.9), and in fact did award her visitation ri(hts. ( H. 11). 
Respondent has failed to refPr t 1 • \ · ~ 1 1 r. , · t Ii 1 t 1-1 ( 1, J 'lip.Ti''': 
Appellant failed to exercise her vi,· 1 tit 1 r: • r 
to maintain contact and a parental rclatic:,nsl1ip with flpr· cLlld-
ren. It is noteworthy that the transfer of Robyn's custody frum 
Respondent to Appellant originated with the child's request to do 
so (R.14); that is hardly indicative of Appellant's failure to 
continue in her role as mother to her children. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT THE 
MODIFICATION SOUGHT SO FAILS TO DO EQUITY 
THAT IT CONSTITUTES A CLEAR ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION, AND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTEL CLEARLY 
PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE COURT'S FINDINGS, 
BY REASON OF WHICH REVERSAL IS APPROPRIATE. 
There is no dispute concerning the appropriate stan-
dards, initially stated by Appellant and reiterated by Respon-
dent, which apply to the consideration by a trial court of a 
request to modify a divorce decree and to the review by this 
Court of the trial court's determination of the issues. The 
trial court appropriately orders modification when, in relation 
to the decree's disposition of property, there exists a substdn-
tial and material change of circumstances warranting sam~. 
Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981). Upon r~vJG~ 
of the trial court's determination of a modificilticr 
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a· cord considerable deference to the trial 
~ : : ' .'' 1"',; r~ rr, t~ r 1 t_ not disturb it unless the evidence 
; r· f ; r ~~ t · :-- ~ t - ~~~-n~t che rin1in£S, or the trial court 
its 11~ 0 ~· 'i·n or mis~pplies principles of law. Openshaw 
i. __ ..:::_~_r1cil-., L_: ' .. d 177, 17b (Utah 1981). It must be remem-
i1 : .. ) v-H- v .;:__ r , ttat the issue of modification of a decree is 
Land v. Land, 605 p. 2d 
1250 (Utah 19bO), and property settlements are not beyond 
tne power of a court of equity to modify. Chandler v. West, 610 
f.2d 129'!, lj(JlJ (Utah 19fl0). 
Having clearly in mind the relevant standards, it 
f'Pl~lnS to apply the facts and circumstances of the present case 
t c th err .• ~espondent makes much of the fact that Appellant 
the marital relationship, as if that just-
-·-·~ eternally withholding from Appellant the dispensation of 
~ •1 u: t y. It must be apparcn:, however, that this fact, far from 
Just1fy1ng the trial court's action, is clearly irrelevant. The 
r;:~('.var:t factors are changes in circumstances "occurring since 
~:" '~:rv of the dEcree and not contemplated in the decree 
1 r " {. 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983) [em-
"L rc;t·r·~l'"" ~; '.he '.act of the divorce itself or the basis for 
.,., r .. · r, -;rir1~· on 'ne is~ue before this Court . 
. , ::.e •J ivcrce, numercus factors have arisen which 
trT : ur :•t.urlt1al ana matErial changes of circumstances 
justifying the modification requested by f,,r·r,elL1nt. 
foremost, Appellant has obt3ined 
Robyn, and is no1-: providil)p: for her c,in. 
to provide Robyn with 
than the apartment they 
a heme rr.c re 
now enJny, 
t ( 
r j r1 (J t 
I r, 
1 I, 
; l t. 
receiving her portion of the 0 riuity in the pdrt1c:.;' r:c>r'r. 
(Trans. 26, 27). While 
requested, additional 
this alone might 
factors also exist. 
justify the 
Appel !ant hCJs 
ried and moved to California, where 
larly housing, far exceeds that 
the ccst of living, ~art_(·u-
in Utah. (Tran::;. 17' 27). 
Respondent, too, has remarried, to a worr.an employed full t i~w ,, l 
earning a substantial income. (Trans. 38, 41). Re::;i:,cnd»nt 's 
new wife now resides with Respondent in the home ln ... h10n 
Appellant owns an interest. (Trans. 38). 
Respondent asserts that these factors fail to r1re to 
the level necessary to justify a modification beca~se A~~ell3rt 
"could" have "easily contemplated" them at the time of t~e 
divorce. (Respondent's Brief at 9). While it is true th~t ar 
individual in the process of a divorce might foresee that in the 
future one or the other of the parties may remarry, U,:,;, C'JC' ,~\' 
of children may change, or that other circu~~tance3 ~r3~· ! ~ 
altered, that does not prevent thosce chani:;es, cinoe tn~y c ·:,r 
from being the basis for a modificatic1 ci of thP nu:i e1;. '.·,•·r1 
so, virtually no modifications would be Justified, :1r, 
modifications follow chani:;cs in v1rc~~s~3nc• 1-.t.: r. 
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t t I"', r. t • :' r 1 ' • , ~ " [1 y the ind iv id u a 1 . But such is not the law; 
;stify modification are those 
l c1, in iid81tic,n le b~in£ material and substantial, were "not 
~ '" ' ;:, ;; l :::i L c d in the ~0cree itself." Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d at 
.15 [e:0~ilsi3 ~uppl1ed]. That is, such changes must be those 
3dCres2ed within the decree (as by expressly recognizing the 
11Kelihood of an occurrence, providing for that which is to take 
~l e upon the occurrence of the contemplated event, or the 
like); this requirement ensures that the subsequent events truly 
substar.cial material changes in circumstances, and not 
tho~e events already considered in arriving at the disposition 
::ntaine: with~~ the decree at the outset. 
The decree in the instant case did not contemplate the 
chilnces in circumstances which have occurred since its entry; it 
i0 entirely silent as to these changes. These changes therefore 
ffiilY ~e considered in determining whether modification is appro-
pr1ate. ~iewing the totality of these circumstances, it is clear 
t~at the ~~idence preponderates in favor of a conclusion contrary 
to th3t reached by the trial court, and in fact material and 
:::ut::::tor.tial ct,ane:es of circumstances have occurred justifying 
1ification uf the parties' decree to require payment to Appel-
•f her interest in the parties' home upon the Respondent's 
: I r· ~ d _' '= • In ild1it1cn, the trial court's failure to order such 
:.1icol1or1, h;tt. the result that Respondent and his new wife, 
",-. ct the iioil1:} to pay to Appellant her interest 
-5-
in the home, continue to reside therein without cumf'"""" t l"ti 
Appe 11 ant and pre v en ts her from prov i d i n f' ,, " ' rr 1 l -ir, i,, , 
child in her custody, so fi,ils to dn t'q1;i t y t 
" ~ I 't ;' ! 
chi 1 d as to constitute an abuse of t '1 e tr' l -~ ; court ' c: rl i ~- c r re t u r; 
For either or both of these reasons, Appellant is entitled tu U1,_ 
relief sought in this appeal. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND 
MISAPPLIED PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN FAILING TO 
ORDER RESPONDENT TO CONTRIBUTE TO COSTS 
REASONABLY AND NECESSARILY EXPENDED BY 
APPELLANT FOR ROBYN'S SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE 
DURING THE PERIOD OF JUNE, 1982, THROUGH THE 
HEARING OF MARCH 11, 1983. 
As noted by Respondent, this issue also is governed by 
equitable considerations and therefore the same standards of 
review apply as were discussed in the preceeding section. The 
trial court's decision is entitled to be upheld unless tne 
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the trial 
court abuses its discretion or misapplies principles of law. 
Openshaw, 639 P.2d at 178. In the instant case, the trial court 
has both abused its discretion and misapplied the relevant 
principles of law. 
As conceded by Respondent, both parents have the otli-
gation to support their children. A concomitant to that pr1nri-
ple is that neither parent should be required to bear thP c,t 11-
-6-
c~L1ori c,f '."1,r f"'rt of ii child alone, if the other parent is 
r r r' c d 1J in g cs n t rib u t ion thereto . "c "'er the 1 es s , the 
"1e trial court's ruling on this issue requires Appel-
i1C1vP t orr,e tne entire obligation for Robyn's support 
Juring thE perio1J of June, 1982, through March 11, 1983, notwith-
st~n~inr Respondent's obligation and ability to contribute 
thereto. 
While Respondent contends that the Uniform Civil Lia-
bility for Support Act, Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-1 et ~·, is 
inapplicable in this case, the plain language of that statute 
belies that assertion. The Act imposes a mutual obligation of 
oupport upon the parents. Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-3 and 78-45-4 
(1377). The Act further defines an "obligor" as •any person 
01,,ing a duty of support[,]" Utah Code Ann. §78-45-2(2) (1982), 
and an "obligee" as "any person to whom a duty of support is 
owed [ , ] " Utah Code Ann. §78-45-2(3) (1982), and provides that 
"[t]he obligee may enforce his right of support against the 
: bligor ... Utan Code Ann. §78-45-9(1) (1982). It grants to 
tne District Courts continuing jurisdiction over all proceedings 
hrougnt pursuant to the Act. Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-6 and 78-45-
0 ( 1':)57) [em~ha=:= sur;plied]. Nowhere in the Act are actions 
·•!'ecnr.g t0 Ut: c Code Ann. §30-3-5 (1979) excluded, nor vice 
""r·r· o2rcccv. 'he twc st2tcte~ must be interpreted together 
.r ,,,i 1 ,r '." in t r1is case. This conclusion is reinforced ty the 
:111c·•·11,• ,,. !'01rn'1 ;:iU.1n the Act at Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9(2) 
-7-
( 1982) , app 1icab1 e to any act ion to rcco'Jt·t' su ,,pc rt ";:h •.· t l1•c r 
under this act or any other ap;;liccohlP :-.t.itut ... " Ir~. 
The Uniform Civil l,iabi J 1 t~· f,.,. :'iir·r· 'rt Aet ,iJ "' "I lllw. , 
but does not make mandat0ry, 
services to proceed on behalf of an obligee. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-9 (1982). However, the State's rights in this regard arl 
solely derivative from the rights of the obligee. Roberts v. 
Roberts, 592 P.2d 597, 599 (Utah 1979); Mecham v. Mecham, 570 
P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 1977). (Cf., The Public Support of Children 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§78-45b-1 et seq., which is exclusively 
designed to apply to the situation where the State has provided 
support to a child and seeks reimbursement from the parent). 
Accordingly, it is clear that, Respondent's assertions to thP 
contrary notwithstanding, this Act and the principles stated in 
those cases referred to in Appellant's earlier brief have direct 
application to the present case. 
Respondent contends that the expenditure by Appellant 01 
Fifteen Hundred to Sixteen Hundred Dollars ($1,500 to $1,600) 
during the relevant time period was not for necessities and wa~ 
greatly excessive. However, the record shows just the op~o~itP. 
The trial court expressly found that Appellant incurred reasor:-
able and necessary expenditures for Rohyn's support during th• 
relevant period in excess of Fifteen Hundred Gollars \ t 1, ',C11) 
which Respondent contributed nothing. !H. Jc,<)) It.qr,:. 
supplied]. The following testimony ty Hcc:;r ·.cr1dent il ~ "''' 1· 
-8-
: : , ' t r "· ' r t : ><H1 c ,_, n s id c ring those expenses t c c: hi c r1 he referred 
I'"'' r ru f as r-xces:o1ve (Respondent's E'.rief at 12), Pespondent 
· ,.,-, l ~ y ('Oris_l_Gt::-~·c,_.. tr.t.:r:, quite reasonable: 
[by Mr. Havas] Yes, over a year's 
~1me, have you s~ent t~D0.00? 
A. [by Respondent] Yes, I have. 
~. De you think it's unusual or unrea-
sonable that cvEr a nine month period of time 
that ever !400.00 will be spent for a child? 
A. No, I don't think it would be 
unreasonable. I think it would be hard if you 
'~C'·n't have ita 
Q. It would be hard if you didn't have 
it, but it's not unreasonable. That's not an 
excessive amount for a child in the mid teens. 
A. I don't think it would be excessive, 
no, it would depend on the time and what needs 
were there. 
( 1r3 n s. !: ' ) • The needs which existed for this child were ex-
plained by Appellant: 
Q. [by Mr. Havas] Will you tell the 
Court briefly why in essentially a nine month 
per~od $425.00 would be expended for clothing 
on this child? 
A. [by Appellant] When Robin (sic) 
came down to live, well, came to visit at 
first, she was overweight, ahh, very unhappy 
young girl. And so as she stayed on with us 
during the s~mmer she lost 20 pounds and 
bec2~se of that and because she wanted to stay 
and live with us, school clothes had to be 
~cu~ht and so normai 2A,cn~!tures of a young 
girl tt~t wanted to go to school and look 
!ike the rest of the ~ids in California, and 
because cf the weight loss. 
C. Okay. W~at was the extent of her 
wardr~be when she came to visit you initially? 
A. C::he had two pairs of levi's, I think 
+ ~ ~-,_ e t- le u'.?~;::;, two dresses, and a ja~ket arid 
t 1, .. ; o pa _ r .:; c ~~ : ~ :--. ,_, c s • 
w. Fairly minimal. 
"· ·0-, fer a three week visit. 
-9-
(Trans. 23). This testimony by both Resporrd' nt 3n.j t·r r >:l L 1 r,, 
clearly illustrates the reasonableness and nu2essity 0f trir" 
expenditures for clothing referred tu. 11, 
the record does Respondent chcillc·nr:e the prc·pri r·Ly of' .my 1cf t hi· 
other expenses included within the sum found by the trial court 
to have been expended, to which Appellant testified in some 
detail. Clearly these sums were, as the trial court expressly 
found, both necessarily and reasonably expended. 
That this is so is easily illustrated in yet another 
way. During the relevant period of time, Appellant was obligated 
to pay to Respondent One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month per 
child, for the support of the children in Respondent's custody. 
During the nearly ten month period from June, 1982, through 
March, 1983, therefore, Appellant's contribution to each child in 
Respondent's custody was One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). At 
the hearing herein, Respondent's counsel took pains to establish 
that Appellant's payments did not fully cover the cost of the 
children's expenses, implying that those payments did not even 
equal the expense to Respondent for these children: 
Q. [by Mr. Page] I see, then I will ask 
it again. Is it your opinion that it costs 
Mr. Stettler more than $100.00 a month per 
child to take care of the children in his 
custody? 
A. [by Appellant] Yes, it would. 
Q. And so essentially you each contri-
bute significantly more than $100.00 to take 
care of the children that you have in ycur 
custody; isn't that true? 
A. That's true. 
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,! ) • if i'P''pr,ndent considers Appellant's $1,000.00 
L' c n t r i '. 1J;., . , r, ''. less than half of his actual cost of 
Lr1r tc 0 • ~! 'ld, he «'1n hardly be heard to c0mplain that 
rxc~::;~ive when spent by Appellant for the support of 
:luring tlte ::;ame rcriod, without contribution at all from 
f,c:ipondent. 
Havint: determined that the expenses incurred by Appe~-
~ ~1 n t in Robyn's behalf were both reasonable and necessary, and 
-na~ ~~~h parents have an equal obligation to support their 
"i':ildren, it is clear that since Appellant bore the entire obli-
ration wit~ revard to Robyn with no assistance from Respondent, 
Re pondent should be required to reimburse Appellant for a 
portion of those expenses. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(3) (1977) 
that "[w]hen no prior court order exists, the court 
~hal: determine and assess all arrearages based upon, but not 
~o: ••• ( b) [ t] he funds that have been reasonably and 
~e~essarily expended in support of spouse and children." This 
allowing for the assessment of arrearages without prior 
~ourt crder, controls in the instant case. 
Respondent would have this Court believe that this 
::;tatute does not apply, since an order existed requ~ring Appel-
lant tc pay cu~pcrt to Respondent for Robyn. Once Robyn began 
.i.~nr hit~~ Appellant provided for her support en-
1 t i:' fo'.:;r ';2 to believe that Appellant continued under 
L 1 r· : ,- r: t n 1- ~ 1 I e '~ r· c n d c n t for Robyn ' s support as we 11 • 
-11-
Indeed, at that time Respondent became ot,l1rat•cd t'' , , r,tr ,c 
Robyn's support, notwithstanding the lack of l , r·rr ,, 1 u r·t 
stating such. Utah Code .Ann. §§1t-4~-1 · t 
court order in existence wit ti re1a' 1 '" t" h· [.' i' : Jl I . 
tion, the provisions of §78-45-~(j) 
amount of arrearages to be assessed agdiost Ro~rondent tor 
Robyn's support. 
.. 
'.1\ 
As noted, the amount of arrearages in such a ca:.;e i::: tc 
be determined by looking to, among other things, the am.c,r,t 
reasonably and necessarily expended for support. The lower cc.ur t. 
having found that reasonable and necessary expenses in exc~ss 1· 
$1,500.00 had been expended, without contribution from Rec~cr-
dent, it clearly misapplied the principles of law found ;1itl.cr1 
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, supra, by failir,, 
to order such contribution. Such misapplication of law l~ 
grounds for reversal. Openshaw, 63'j 0 .2d c: :;'". 
An additional ground for reversal is abuse of the tr1 co: 
court's discretion. Id. A judgment which fails to do equity ma} 
constitute an abuse of discretion. Watson v. ~atson, 56 1 
1072, 1074 (Utah 1977). In the present case, the lower 
judgment denying Appellant contribution 
Robyn's support during the relevant period has the cff~ct a' r·-
quiring Appellant to be solely respcnsit~·- f:::r Fubyn's r.Jf.!'' 
the same time that she is accepting her f.Ort1or: ,_,f the r'• 
bility for the support of the children 
-12-
j ' j ~ :ur,J, c:or.,r.,.L~tely co:capes any obligation .fc 
~uch disparate treatment of the parties, 
is patently 
~uch a judgment so fails to do equity as to constitute 
in the interests of 
t:2P, must correct. Id. 
Eecause of both the court's failure to correctly apply 
t lie relevant principles of law and its abuse of discretion in 
r~ndering this decision, it is appropriate that this Court 
r·everse the trial court's ruling and require Respondent to con-
tribute to the expenses incurred by Appellant for Robyn's 
support during the relevant period. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SPECIFY 
THE DOLLAR AMOUNT EQUIVALENT OF THE SUPPORT 
AWARD GRANTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF ROBYN. 
~s more fully stated in Appellant's earlier brief, the 
trial court awarded child support from Respondent to Appellant, 
R0byn's benefit, but neglected to state an amount thereof. 
Eather than specifying the amount of such support, the court 
~ere:y stated that it would offset that which Appellant would be 
clred to pay Respondent for the parties' eldest child. The 
' u2 l ~0llar value of s~2~ support was further confused by the 
c.c'.10~ 01 ~~e 3~cunt of Appellant's support obligation 
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